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Abstract
We consider the setting of combinatorial auctions when the agents are single-minded and have no
contingent reasoning skills. We are interested in mechanisms that provide the right incentives to
these imperfectly rational agents, and therefore focus our attention to obviously strategyproof (OSP)
mechanisms. These mechanisms require that at each point during the execution where an agent is
queried to communicate information, it should be “obvious” for the agent what strategy to adopt in
order to maximise her utility. In this paper we study the potential of OSP mechanisms with respect
to the approximability of the optimal social welfare.
We consider two cases depending on whether the desired bundles of the agents are known or
unknown to the mechanism. For the case of known-bundle single-minded agents we show that OSP
can actually be as powerful as (plain) strategyproofness (SP). In particular, we show that we can
implement the very same algorithm used for SP to achieve a
√
m-approximation of the optimal social
welfare with an OSP mechanism, m being the total number of items. Restricting our attention to
declaration domains with two values, we provide a 2-approximate OSP mechanism, and prove that
this approximation bound is tight. We also present a randomised mechanism that is universally OSP
and achieves a finite approximation of the optimal social welfare for the case of arbitrary size finite
domains. This mechanism also provides a bounded approximation ratio when the valuations lie in a
bounded interval (even if the declaration domain is infinitely large). For the case of unknown-bundle
single-minded agents, we show how we can achieve an approximation ratio equal to the size of
the largest desired set, in an OSP way. We remark this is the first known application of OSP to
multi-dimensional settings, i.e., settings where agents have to declare more than one parameter.
Our results paint a rather positive picture regarding the power of OSP mechanisms in this
context, particularly for known-bundle single-minded agents. All our results are constructive, and
even though some known strategyproof algorithms are used, implementing them in an OSP way is a
non-trivial task.
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1 Introduction
Algorithms might not have direct access to their inputs. This is by now a well-known issue,
motivated by the internet and the self interests thereon. A body of work in computer
science has been devoted to the design of algorithms that can faithfully elicit the input
from their selfish sources. Typically, this is achieved through so-called mechanism design, a
subdiscipline of game theory that studies the design of functions, or mechanisms, where the
input is provided by multiple self-interested agents, and the output, or outcome, needs to
satisfy a set of pre-specified desirable objectives. Each agent has a certain utility for each
outcome. In its most general definition, a mechanism is given by a multi-round interaction
protocol between a central authority and the agents, defining a game wherein the central
authority wants to compute a certain function of the agents’ inputs and the agents choose
a strategy leading to the outcome that maximises their own utility. The main design
requirements for such mechanisms are:
Strategyproofness (SP). There is a strategy for each agent that is guaranteed to result in a
better outcome than any other strategy that the agent may adopt, irrespective of the
other agents’ strategies.
(Approximate) economic efficiency. The outcome of the mechanism must have a quality
that is close to a theoretical optimum; this is often measured in terms of social welfare,
i.e., the sum of all the agents’ utilities.
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have emerged as the paradigmatic problem in the area,
exemplifying the tension between these two desiderata and the polynomial-time computation
of the outcome. In CAs, we are given a set of items that need to be sold among a set of
agents who are interested in buying the items. These agents express valuations for each of
the items, or certain bundles of items, or even each possible bundle of items, depending on
the level of complexity of the utility model that is assumed. A mechanism in this setting
must determine how the items are allocated to the agents, and how much each agent is going
to be charged.
Whilst it is not known to what extent it is possible to guarantee the properties above
with polynomial-time algorithms, the design of mechanisms that satisfy these objectives is
reasonably well-understood for some sufficiently simple auction settings. This is the case for
the optimization problem of interest to this study, single-minded combinatorial auctions. In
such a setting, there are multiple agents and multiple items to be allocated. An agent’s utility
function has a simple form: It is determined by a valuation of the set of items that the agent
gets allocated, from which a potential payment charged by the mechanism is subtracted. The
valuation function has the following structure: For an agent, say i, there is a number vi and
a subset of items Ri such that her valuation is vi whenever the allocated bundle contains Ri,
and 0 otherwise. The utility of each agent is therefore determined by a single pair (vi, Ri).
This simple setting has been the central object of study of the celebrated paper [17], where
the authors design a simple greedy mechanism that is strategyproof and approximates the
optimal social welfare to within a factor of
√
m, where m is the number of items. It is
well-known that this combinatorial optimisation problem is NP-hard and inapproximable
within a factor of
√
m unless NP = ZPP [14].
In many important cases, however, the implementation of strategyproof mechanisms can
be too complex, unintelligible, unintuitive, or cognitively too demanding due to the limited
ability of typical agents, such as, the capability to carry out contingent reasoning. Even for
the simple setting of one-item auctions, a special case of single-minded agents, it is known
how implementation details matter, see, for example, [2], for a discussion on the differences
B. de Keijzer, M. Kyropoulou, and C. Ventre 71:3
between sealed bid versus ascending bid auctions, and [15] for a related experimental study.
We refer furthermore to [6] and [4] for further reading on the issue of contingent reasoning.
Hence, the theoretically strong mechanisms that have been proposed in past mechanism
design literature may be too difficult to understand and to use for agents with imperfect
rationality.
This problem motivates the design of mechanisms with a reduced cognitive burden for
agents who participate in the mechanism: Mechanisms should be very easy to understand,
and transparent to participate in. While it is somewhat of a challenge to satisfactorily define
formally what a “low cognitive burden” comprises, the concept of obvious strategyproofness
(OSP) which has been introduced in [18] provides a strong and reasonably satisfactory notion
in the context of agents unable to reason contingently. Informally, OSP requires that at each
point during the execution of a mechanism where an agent is queried to reveal information
(i.e., point where an agent is asked to make a decision about how the execution of the
mechanism should proceed), it should be “obvious” for the agent what strategy to adopt in
order to maximise her utility: For the agent, there must be a single choice for which it holds
that all outcomes that can result from that choice are better for her than any other outcome
that can result from an alternative choice. OSP therefore strengthens the classical notion of
strategyproofness.
Our contributions. We study the extent to which OSP mechanisms can return good
approximations to the optimal social welfare in the setting of single-minded combinatorial
auctions. We measure the quality of mechanisms in terms of a relative approximation ratio.
As in much of the literature on OSP, we assume that the set of possible types that the agents
can have (which we refer to as the declaration domain) is publicly known; this is either finite
or contained in a closed interval. As for the agents, we prove results depending on whether
they are known-bundle single-minded – whereby the valuation vi for agent i’s desired bundle
Ri is not known but Ri is – or, unknown-bundle single-minded, for which neither vi nor Ri is
known and must be elicited in an OSP way.
For the case of known-bundle single-minded agents, we provide the following results.
If there are only two possible valuations, i.e., a low valuation L and a high valuation
H, we express the characterisation of OSP mechanisms in [7] conveniently and design a
deterministic OSP mechanism with an approximation ratio of 2, which we show to be
the best possible. We give explicit payment functions for this mechanism and we can
prove that truthtelling agents always have non-negative utility (a property known as
individual rationality (IR)). We furthermore show that if the OSP mechanism were to use
a fixed ordering of agents that does not depend on the instance, then the approximation
guarantee of the mechanism is unbounded.
If the declaration domain is an arbitrarily large finite set, we derive an OSP mechanism
that achieves an approximation ratio of
√
m to the optimal social welfare. This mechanism
can be regarded as an obviously strategy-proof implementation of the mechanism in
[17]. The payments here are implicitly given through the cycle monotonicity technique
developed in [7]. Our mechanism makes use of the fact that the domain is finite and that
the desired bundles are known.
We further provide a randomised OSP and IR mechanism that achieves an approximation
ratio strictly less than d, where d is the cardinality of the declaration domain. In particular,
for arbitrary size finite domains of d valuations V1 < · · · < Vd, our mechanism achieves
a (d − V1/V2 − · · · − Vd−1/Vd)-approximation of the optimal social welfare. The idea
behind this mechanism is to simply draw at random (with a carefully chosen probability
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distribution) one value from the domain and ask agents if their valuation is at least as
big; the mechanism thus stays OSP even if agents had access to the randomness used (i.e.,
they are “universally OSP”). We note that this result improves the aforementioned bound
of 2 for two-value domains, and approaches 2 as V1/V2 → 0. We also generalise this result
for (uncountable) valuations contained in an interval [a, b] and derive the continuous limit
of the above mechanism, which results in an OSP and IR mechanism for this setting that
achieves an approximation ratio of 1 + ln(b/a) to the optimal social welfare. This means
that the approximation ratio only grows logarithmically in the relative size of the interval.
The results above paint a rather positive picture regarding the power of OSP mechanisms
for CAs with known-bundle single-minded agents. Firstly, our upper bound of
√
m, for
finite valuation domains, matches what is known for strategyproofness – this is, to best
of our knowledge, the first case in which OSP has been proved to be as powerful as SP.
([16] proves an asymptotic equivalence for randomised OSP without money for a variant
of a scheduling problem.) The only additional time we need is used to sweep through
the declaration domain of the agents, a seemingly unavoidable step to guarantee an OSP
implementation of direct-revelation mechanisms. Secondly, this result shows that Deferred
Acceptance (DA) auctions, whilst being OSP, are not the right algorithmic approach to
optimise the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms. We in fact beat the lower bounds
proved in [5] regarding the approximation guarantee of DA auctions in this setting. This
observation reinforces the findings in [7, 9] concerning the power of DAs vs OSP, in the
context of scheduling related machines. Thirdly, our tight bounds for two-value domains show
(i) how the graph-theoretic approach to OSP in [7] can be made operational; and, (ii) that
the order in which the mechanism queries the set of agents is of crucial importance in the
design of the mechanism. Finally, our randomised OSP mechanisms show how it is possible
to leverage “internal” chance nodes [18] and beat deterministic mechanisms, whilst agents do
not need to compute expectations. This is to our knowledge the first known application of
randomisation over OSP mechanisms.
OSP has so far only been considered for single-parameter settings, i.e., where the agents’
private information is a single number, as no explicit technique is known to implement OSP
mechanisms for higher dimensional settings. However, we complete this paper by giving
the first OSP mechanism for agents with richer declaration domains. We in fact provide
an OSP mechanism for the case of unknown-bundle single-minded agents, that returns an
approximation of the optimal social welfare equal to the maximum size of a desired set Ri.
This is an OSP implementation of the well-known Greedy-by-valuation algorithm for CAs.
To obtain this result, we leverage the cycle monotonicity characterisation of OSP in [7] and
an approach recently used in [10] to deal with long negative cycles. The idea is to give
a structural property of the negative-weight cycles that have more than two vertices, for
mechanisms that satisfy a natural notion of monotonicity between two instances. We then
prove that any such mechanism that additionally queries the agents monotonically (that is,
from an extreme of the domain to the other, irrespective of the desired set) cannot have any
long negative-weight cycle. This is only proved to be a sufficient condition; the extent to
which this is also necessary (proved to be true for single-parameter settings in [10]) will say
whether our bound can be improved or not. This is the main open problem left by our work.
Further Related Work. The notion of OSP introduced in [18] has spawned numerous
subsequent studies in both the computer science and economics community.
In [1], the authors study the OSP concept in the context of stable matchings and provide
a suitable mechanism under an acyclicity assumption, as well as an impossibility result
for a more general setting. The paper [3] further studies this concept for housing markets,
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single-peaked domains, and a general quasi-linear mechanism design setting. In [20] the
authors study OSP mechanisms in general design domains where monetary transfers are not
possible, and they provide a useful characterisation of OSP mechanisms in this setting.
OSP was investigated in machine scheduling domains and set system problems in [7],
published in [9, 8], and furthermore a study was done in [11] where the authors prove that a
restriction on the agents’ declaration called monitoring can help obtain OSP mechanisms
with a good approximation ratio in various mechanism design domains. The paper [16]
builds forth on this by studying machine scheduling in the absence of monetary payments.
For machine scheduling, a generalisation of OSP is furthermore studied in [13] where the
restriction on the ability of agents to reason contingently is weakened, and the authors show
that a large amount of “look-ahead”-ability is required for the agents in any mechanism that
achieves a good approximation ratio in the considered scheduling setting. Another study
that considers OSP under a restriction on the agents’ behavior is [12], where the authors
assume that non-truthful behaviour can be detected and penalised with a certain probability.
In [19] a revelation principle is presented that states that every social choice function
implementable through an OSP mechanism can be implemented using a certain structured
OSP protocol where agents take turns making announcements about their valuations.
2 Preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction we have a set U of m items and a set N of n agents. Each agent
i has a private valuation function vi and, in the general case, is interested in obtaining only
one set in a private collection Si of subsets of U , also called bundles. Thus, the valuation
function maps subsets of items to nonnegative real numbers (vi(∅) is normalised to be 0).
The agents’ valuations are monotone: for S ⊇ T we have vi(S) ≥ vi(T ). In single minded
combinatorial auctions, |Si| = 1, each agent i is interested in obtaining only one particular
subset of U ; we denote i’s desired bundle by Ri. This implies that agent i’s valuation is
the same for all supersets of Ri, while it is 0 otherwise. Formally, consider agent i and let
Si = {Ri}. The valuation function of agent i for a given set S is
vi(S) =
{
vi if S ⊇ Ri,
0 otherwise. (1)
where (with a slight notation overloading) vi ∈ R≥0 is a non-negative real number. Note
that the valuation function of an agent i is fully represented by her desired set Ri and
her valuation for that set vi. The goal is to find a partition (S1, . . . , Sn) of U such that∑n
i=1 vi(Si) –the social welfare (SW)– is maximised. We denote the optimal (maximum
possible) social welfare by SW ∗ (we omit the dependence on the instance as it will be clear
from the context).
We consider two versions of single-minded combinatorial auctions. In the case of unknown-
bundle single-minded agents, we assume that the desired sets Ri and the valuations vi are
private knowledge of the agents, while in the known-bundle single-minded agents case, we
assume that the desired sets Ri are known and only the valuations vi are private knowledge
of the agents. In each case, we refer to the private information of an agent as her type.
Agents are typically asked to declare their types. We use Di, the declaration domain of agent
i, to denote the set of all possible types of agent i. In this paper we will consider declaration
domains that are identical for all agents i, i.e., Di = D. We use b = (b1, . . . , bn) to denote
declaration profiles, so that bi ∈ D stands for an agent i’s demanded set Ri along with the
valuation vi that she has for it.
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We want to design an auction mechanism that interacts with the agents in any sequence,
and outputs (based on this interaction) an allocation Ai of items to each agent i, along with a
payment Pi > 0 that is charged to each agent i. The allocation function satisfies that each item
is allocated to exactly one agent. We refer to such a pair (A = (A1, . . . , An), P = (P1, . . . Pn))
as an outcome. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utility functions, that is, agent i
with type bi has a utility of
ui(bi,b−i) = vi(Ai)− Pi
for outcome (A,P ). Each agent will interact strategically with the mechanism, so as to make
it output an outcome that maximises her utility.
When designing the mechanism, we want to define allocations and payments in such a
way that they induce a certain type of behaviour of the strategically acting agents, while
simultaneously ensuring that the outcome maximises or approximately maximises the social
welfare. In particular, we aim to design obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms. To define
this notion, we view a mechanism in the form of an implementation tree T that captures the
way in which the mechanism interacts with the agents [18, 7].
We now introduce some notation around T before we formally define the OSP notion.
Each internal node u of T is labeled with an agent Q(u), called the divergent agent at u, and
the outgoing edges from u are labeled with sets of types in the declaration domain of Q(u).
At node u, the agent Q(u) is queried and asked to choose an action, that corresponds to
selecting one of u’s outgoing edges. The labels of the outgoing edges of u form a partition of
the current domain of i, denoted as Di(u). The current domain Di(u) is equal to the label
of the last edge e in the path from the root to u that i chose as an action. When player Q(u)
chooses an outgoing edge at node u, we say that the chosen action signals that the type of
Q(u) is in the set of types labeling the chosen edge. If a pair of types in the current domain
of agent i occur in the labels of two distinct outgoing edges of u, we say that i is asked to
separate the two possible types at u. The leaves of the tree will thus be linked to (a set of)
type profiles; and at each leaf the mechanism will return an outcome (A,P ) accordingly;
in other words, each leaf corresponds to an outcome of the mechanism. (Observe that this
means that the domain of A and P is effectively given by the leaves of T .)
A mechanism (viewed in the form of an implementation tree as described above) is said
to be OSP if at each node where an agent is asked to diverge, she always maximises her
utility by choosing the edge (u, u′) with the label containing her own type, in every node.
That is, if we call the latter strategy s, then a mechanism is said to be OSP if the worst
possible outcome after signaling her true type (taken over all the reachable outcomes in the
leaves of the subtree rooted at u′, with respect to s) gives her a utility at least as good as
when she would get the best possible outcome after choosing any other edge (u, u′′) at that
particular point in the implementation tree (taken over all the outcomes in the leaves of the
subtree rooted at u′′). The corresponding utility-maximising strategies played by the players
are called the OSP strategies. In cases where we discuss any particular OSP mechanism, we
use (A(b), P (b)) to denote the outcome (i.e., allocation and payment vector) that results
from agents playing their OSP strategies, i.e., strategy profiles where each agent at every
node in the mechanism follows the edge containing her type.
We call a type profile b compatible with u ∈ T iff for each edge (u′, u′′) on the path
from the root to u, the label of (u′, u′′) contains bQ(u′). We furthermore say that two type
profiles (t,b−i) and (b,b′−i) diverge at u if i = Q(u) and t and b are labels of different edges
outgoing from u (we sometimes will abuse this terminology and we also say that t and b
diverge at u). For every agent i and types t, b ∈ Di, we let uit,b denote a vertex u in the
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implementation tree T , such that (t,b−i) and (b,b′−i) are compatible with u, but diverge at
u for some b−i,b′−i ∈ D−i(u) = ×j 6=iDj(u). Note that such a vertex might not be unique as
agent i will be asked to separate t from b in different paths from the root (but only once
for every such path). We call these vertices of T tb-separating for agent i. For example, the
node r in the tree in Figure 1 is an LH-separating node for agent 1; while v and w are two






























Figure 1 An implementation tree with three agents with two-value domains {L, H}; each agent
separates the domain types upon playing; at each leaf li the mechanism computes A(b) and P (b),
b being the declaration vector at li.
We also consider randomised mechanisms that are universally OSP, in Section 5. Such
mechanisms are probability distributions on OSP mechanisms.
Besides the OSP requirement, we would like our mechanisms to satisfy (ex-post) individual
rationality (IR), i.e., when an agent plays an OSP strategy, the agent is guaranteed an outcome
that gives her a non-negative utility. We measure the quality of mechanisms in terms of a
relative approximation ratio, i.e., an upper bound on the ratio of the optimal social welfare
and the social welfare of the outcome of the mechanism.
3 Deterministic mechanisms for known-bundle single-minded agents
We now focus on the case of known-bundle single-minded agents, i.e. the desired sets of
the agents are known by the mechanism, and only the valuations of the agents for their
corresponding desired set is private information. We let vi, i ∈ N denote the valuation of
agent i for her desired bundle, and slightly abusing notation, we use SW (I) =
∑
i∈I vi where
I is a set of agents who can be allocated their desired bundles at the same time.
3.1 Domains of size 2
We first restrict attention to the case where the declaration domain of each agent has two
possible values and begin with a simple and elegant characterisation of individually rational
OSP mechanisms for the case of known-bundle single-minded agents with two-value domains
Di = {L,H}, for i ∈ N .
I Definition 1 (C mechanisms). We define a class C of mechanisms, that only use the
following types of queries:
L-query: The divergent agent is asked to separate L and H. If she signals L then she
will not get her desired bundle (regardless of the future).
H-query: The divergent agent is asked to separate L and H. If she signals H then she is
guaranteed to get her desired bundle.
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I Theorem 2. The class C of mechanisms characterises deterministic IR and OSP mechan-
isms for the case where the declaration domain is {L,H} and the desired bundles are known,
in the following sense:
There exist payments such that every mechanism in C is deterministic IR and OSP.
Every deterministic IR OSP mechanism is equivalent to a mechanism in C with respect
to their allocations, i.e. for every possible valuation profile of the agents, the allocations
resulting from both mechanisms are identical.
Proof. Regarding the first claim, fix the payment of an agent who is allocated her bundle to
be L, and the payment to be 0 otherwise. It should be straightforward to see why pairing
mechanisms in C with these payment yields a deterministic IR mechanism. Moreover, observe
that regardless of the query, if an agent has valuation L, then her utility will be 0 regardless
of her signals and allocation (even if she is allocated her bundle, then she will be asked to
pay L). If an agent has valuation H and she is asked an L-query, she can only get positive
utility for signaling her true valuation H, while if she is asked an H-query, she can guarantee
herself the maximum possible utility under the mechanism (H − L) again by reporting her
true valuation H. This demonstrates that whenever an agent is asked to diverge, she is not
worse off by acting according to her true type in any possible future scenario, hence OSP is
satisfied.
Regarding the second claim, consider any OSP mechanism and its associated implementa-
tion tree T . Clearly, since we are dealing with the case of two-type domains, if T has a node
with more than two children, then this node can be pruned to yield an OSP mechanism where
the node has exactly two children. Furthermore, nodes that have only one child are trivial
and can be removed from the tree. So, at every node in T an agent is asked to separate L
and H, and at any path from the root to a leaf in T each agent is only asked to diverge at
most once.
Next, fix a node u ∈ T and let agent i = Q(u) be the divergent agent at u. Suppose for a
contradiction that if i signals L when queried at u, then it is possible that i gets her desired
bundle, while if i signals H then it is possible that i is not allocated her desired bundle. In
other words, the corresponding subtrees of T have outcomes oL where i gets her desired
bundle when signaling L, and oH where i doesn’t get her desired bundle when signaling H.
In this case the OSP condition would be violated at node u when vi = H, as i’s utility under
oH is lower than under oL (by IR the payment under oH is 0, while the payment under oL is
at most L). We can conclude that at any node w ∈ T , either all possible outcomes when the
divergent agent j = Q(w) signals L do not allocate j’s desired bundle to j, or all outcomes
when j signals H allocate j’s desired bundle to j. These two alternatives correspond to the
L-queries and H-queries in the definition of Q. J
Next, we use the above characterisation theorem1 to provide a tight bound on the
approximability of the optimal social welfare under OSP mechanisms.
I Theorem 3. The IS mechanism described in Algorithm 1 is an OSP mechanism that
achieves an approximation ratio ρ ≤ 2 for the case of known-bundle single-minded agents
and domains of size 2.
Proof. Consider any instance of the problem, let I ⊆ N be the allocation output by IS, and
let I∗ ⊆ [n] be the SW-maximising allocation according to the true valuations. Also fix N to
its value at the last iteration of IS. At the last iteration of IS it holds that every agent in
1 Note that Theorem 2 essentially expresses the cycle monotonicity property of [7] in a convenient way.
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Algorithm 1 The IS mechanism.
1 N ← N (N is the set of agents currently under consideration) Aq ← ∅ (Aq is the set
of agents who have already been queried) I ← ∅ (I is the set of agents currently
allocated their desired bundle) vi = L, for i ∈ N (Our mechanism originally assumes
that all agents have valuation L)
2 Compute the SW-maximising feasible allocation and update set I accordingly
3 while there exists an agent i ∈ N \Aq who is not in I do
4 Perform an L-query to i (break ties arbitrarily)
5 if i signals L then
6 N = N \ {i}
7 else
8 vi = H
9 Compute the SW-maximising feasible allocation of items to agents in N and
update I
10 Return I
11 If an agent i is allocated her desired bundle, i.e. i ∈ I, charge her L, otherwise charge
0.
N \ I has been queried. Mechanism IS belongs to the class C of mechanisms (Definition 1),
and hence by Theorem 2 is IR and OSP. So, we can assume that the agents who have been
queried have signaled their true valuation. Regarding the agents that have not been queried,
the mechanism assumes valuation L when computing the SW-maximising allocation, while
their true valuation could potentially be higher; all these agents have been allocated their
desired bundle. This leads to the conclusion that I is the SW-maximising allocation of N
with respect to the true valuations, which in turn implies that SW (I) ≥ SW (I∗ ∩N ).
We now claim that SW (I) ≥ SW (I∗ \ N ). Observe that any agent who does not belong
to N has valuation L. All these agents were considered in line 2 of Algorithm 1 as having
valuation L indeed; denote SW1 the SW computed in line 2 of Algorithm 1. So, it holds that
SW (I∗ \N ) ≤ SW1 ≤ SW (I), where the second inequality holds because the SW computed
in Algorithm 1 can only increase between rounds.
Combining the above, we derive that SW (I∗) = SW (I∗ ∩N ) + SW (I∗ \ N ) ≤ 2SW (I),
as desired. J
Next, we show that the above bound is tight by designing a family of instances where no
mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 2. This results shows a separation
between obviously strategy proof mechanisms and strategy proof mechanisms, in terms of
social welfare.
I Theorem 4. For the setting that the domain is of size 2 and desired bundles are known,
no OSP and IR mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 2.
Proof. By Theorem 2 we may restrict our analysis to mechanisms in class C as defined in
Definition 1. Consider any such mechanism M ∈ C.
Consider an instance with m items and a set N of n = 2
√
m agents. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,
√
m},








m− 1)} and Ti = {i− 1, (i−
1) +
√
m, (i− 1) + 2
√




m}. Let agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,
√
m} desire bundle Si,
and let agent i ∈ {
√
m+ 1, . . . , 2
√
m} desire bundle Ti. Note that the agents are intuitively
split in two equal-sized groups, A and B, such that the desired bundle of an agent in A
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overlaps with the desired bundle of all agents in B and vice versa. Consider such a split
and let G(i) ∈ {A,B} denote the group of agents that i belongs to, and G(i) = N \ G(i).
The valuations of the agents in our instance depend on the sequence of queries made in
the implementation tree T of mechanism M . We let H = n/2 and L = 1, and we define
the valuations of the divergent agents in turn, starting with the first divergent agent and
considering divergent agents in a sequence on the path of T , where previous agents have
signaled their true valuation. Let i refer to the agent whose valuation we define at the
current step:
(i) If agent i is asked an L-query, no agent has been asked an H-query so far, and at least
3 agents in G(i) have not been queried at this point: Set vi = L.
(ii) If i is the first agent that is asked an H-query, and there are at least 3 agents in G(i)
that have not been queried at this point: Set vi = H, set vj = L for each agent j ∈ G(i)
that has not been queried at this point, and set vj = H for each j ∈ G(i) that has not
been queried at this point.
(iii) If no agent has been asked an H-query so far, and exactly 2 agents in G(i) \ {i} have
not been queried at this point: Set vi = H, and set vj = L for every agent j that has
not been queried at this point.
Observe that the above three points yield a complete and consistent specification of the
valuations of all agents.
Clearly, in any mechanism with bounded approximation ratio, one of cases (ii) or (iii)
in the definition of valuations above is realised, since otherwise, M will not allocate any
desired bundle to any agent. Assume first that case (ii) is realised, and let i′ be the agent
who is H-queried at that point. i′ will signal her true valuation H, and will be allocated her
desired bundle by the definition of an H-query. Hence, no agent in G(i′) can be allocated
her desired bundle and there are at least 3 such agents with valuation H. Therefore the
optimal social welfare in this case is at least 3H + (n/2− 3)L, but the mechanism can only
allocate to a subset of G(i), resulting in a social welfare of at most H + (n/2− 1)L. Thus,
the approximation ratio of M in this case is at least
3H + (n/2− 3)L




Suppose now that case (iii) in the definition of valuations above is realised, and let i∗
be the agent who is queried at that point. By definition of the instance, the optimal social
welfare now is H + (n/2− 1)L. In case M gives the desired bundles to a subset of agents
in G(i∗), then this subset may contain only agent i∗ and the remaining two agents of G(i∗)
who have not been queried yet with valuation L, yielding a social welfare of H + 2L. Recall
that everyone else in G(i∗) has signaled L to an L-query, hence can not be allocated her
desired bundle. In case M gives the desired bundles to a subset of agents in G(i∗), then the
social welfare of M is at most (n/2)L. Thus, the approximation ratio of M in this case is at
least H+(n/2−1)Lmax{H+2L,(n/2)L} . By setting H = n/2 and L = 1 we get
H + (n/2− 1)L
max{H + 2L, (n/2)L} =
n− 1
n/2 + 2 =
2n− 2
n+ 4 . (3)
The limit of both bounds (2) and (3) as n→∞ is 2, and this proves the claim. J
We now provide a stronger inapproximability bound for the case where the mechanism
is restricted to be instance-independent, i.e., the mechanism’s implementation tree is not
dependent on the demanded bundles of the agents. That is, there is a mapping from nodes
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in the implementation tree to queried players and respective query types, and this mapping
is fixed, i.e., it is not a function of the demanded bundles of the agents. Note that e.g. the
mechanism of Theorem 3 is not instance-independent, because the order in which the players
are queried and the types of queries that the mechanism asks, do depend on the demanded
bundles of the players.
I Theorem 5. No instance-independent mechanism has a bounded approximation ratio.
Proof. Consider any instance-independent OSP and IR mechanism M . We define the
instance (valuations and desired bundles) that yields the upper bound by considering the
sequence of queries made in the implementation tree T ofM . We start with the first divergent
agent and consider divergent agents in a sequence on the path of T , where previous agents
have signaled their true valuation. Let i refer to the ith queried agent, whose valuation is
vi and whose desired bundle is Ri. Let Q(i) denote the set of agents who have not been
queried yet at the time that i is queried by the mechanism. As T is instance-independent,
we may construct an instance with a bad approximation ratio for this mechanism by letting
the agents’ valuation and demanded bundles depend on the sequence of queries that the
mechanism asks. We do this as follows:
(i) If agent i is asked an L-query: Set vi = L and let Ri comprise a single item that does
not belong to the desired bundle of any other agent.
(ii) If agent i is asked an H-query: Set vi = H and vj = H for each agent j ∈ Q(i). Let
Rj comprise a single item, distinct for each j ∈ Q(i) and not being desired by any
previously considered agent. Also, let Ri = ∪j∈Q(i)Rj .
In any mechanism with a finite approximation ratio, case (ii) in the definition of the instance
above is realised, since otherwise, M will not allocate any desired bundle to any agent.
Suppose ` L-queries are asked before the first H-query on the path of T discussed in the
definition of the instance. The optimal social welfare is at least `L+ (n− `− 1)H, while M
can only obtain social welfare equal to H by allocating to the agent who got the H-query.
Thus, the approximation ratio ρ of M is at least
ρ ≥ `L+ (n− `− 1)H
H





since ` ≤ n− 1. The ratio can be made arbitrarily high, for suitable values of L and H. J
3.2 Large domains
In this section we prove an upper bound of
√
m for the approximation ratio of OSP mechanisms
for known-bundle single minded agents and arbitrary domains. We begin with definitions of
classes of mechanisms that are of interest. First, we define extremal mechanisms. Informally,
the queries of an extremal mechanism always separate an extreme of the current domain of the
queried agent from the rest of her current domain (the same extreme is chosen consistently).
Formally,
I Definition 6 (Extremal mechanism). A mechanism with implementation tree T is an
extremal mechanism if for each internal node u ∈ T , and divergent agent i = Q(u) at u,
agent i’s current domain Di(u) is partitioned by the query at u into a singleton, containing
the maximum element (or minimum element, consistently), and the remaining elements of
Di(u).
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Algorithm 2 An extensive-form implementation of the Greedy algorithm in [17] for
known-bundle single-minded agents.
1 Define function Φi as Φi(x) = x/
√
|Ri|.
2 P ← ∅ (P is the set of bundles that have already been allocated) N ← N (N is the
set of agents currently under consideration) Di ← Di for all i ∈ N (Di is the set of
values in i’s domain currently under consideration)
3 while N 6= ∅ do
4 Let j = arg maxk∈N Φk(maxDk)
5 if there is S in P such that Rj ∩ S 6= ∅ then
6 N = N \ {j}
7 else
8 Ask j if her valuation is maxDj
9 if yes then
10 P ← P ∪ {Rj}
11 N = N \ {j}
12 else
13 Dj = Dj \ {maxDj}
14 Return P
I Definition 7 (Cd mechanisms). We define a class Cd of mechanisms, whose implementation
tree T satisfies:
Consider a divergent agent i who is asked to separate between valuations vi and v′i with
vi < v
′
i at some internal node u ∈ T . Consider any outcome ovi in the subtree rooted at
u consistent with signaling valuation vi. Then if i is allocated her desired bundle under
ovi , she also gets her desired bundle in all possible outcomes consistent with signaling
valuation v′i at u.
I Theorem 8. Every extremal mechanism that belongs to class Cd is OSP.
Theorem 8 is a special case of Theorem 12 which we present in Section 4. We note that
Theorem 8 is one direction of the characterisation in [10].
I Theorem 9. Algorithm 2 is an OSP mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio
ρ ≤
√
m, for the case of known-bundle single-minded agents.
Proof. The approximation guarantee of the algorithm is well known in the literature, cf. [17].
By Theorem 8, it remains to prove that Algorithm 2 is extremal and belongs to class Cd.
Indeed, observe that queries only take place in line 8 of the algorithm, where the corresponding
divergent agent is asked to separate the maximum value in her current domain from all other
possible values.
We will now prove that the algorithm belongs to class Cd (see Definition 7). Indeed, when
an agent is queried in line 8 then she is allocated her set when replying yes (as feasibility has
been previously guaranteed). Since we only query for the maximum in the current domain of
each agent, this implies that the agent would still be allocated her desired bundle had her
true valuation (and signals) been higher. J
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4 Deterministic mechanisms for unknown-bundle single-minded
agents
In this section we prove an upper bound to the approximability of the optimal social welfare
of single-minded combinatorial auctions by OSP mechanisms. It is now assumed that both
the desired bundle of the agent and her valuation for it belong to her type, hence are private
information. We first define a general class of mechanisms which we prove are OSP. We then
provide an implementation of the known Greedy-by-valuation mechanism and prove that it
belongs to this class.
Let us define the class of valuation-extremal mechanisms. Informally, the queries of a
valuation-extremal mechanism at every node separates extreme valuations in the current
domain of the queried agent from the rest of her current domain (where the same extreme is
chosen consistently). Formally,
I Definition 10 (Valuation-extremal mechanism). A mechanism with implementation tree T is
a valuation-extremal mechanism if for each internal node u ∈ T , and divergent agent i = Q(u)
at u, it holds that either agent i’s current domain, Di(u), comprises a single valuation, or
Di(u) is partitioned by the query at u into a set containing all the pairs (v, S) ∈ Di(u),
where v is the maximum valuation (or minimum valuation, consistently) in Di(u), and the
remaining elements of Di(u).
I Definition 11 (Cud mechanisms). We define a class Cud of mechanisms, whose implementation
tree T satisfies:
Consider a divergent agent i who is asked to separate between (vi, Si) 6= (v′i, S′i) with
v′i ≥ vi and S′ ⊆ S, at some internal node u ∈ T . Consider any outcome o(vi,Si) in
the subtree rooted at u consistent with signalling type (vi, Si). Then if i is allocated her
desired bundle under o(vi,Si), she also gets her desired bundle in all possible outcomes
consistent with signalling type (v′i, S′i) at u.
I Theorem 12. Every valuation-extremal mechanism that belongs to class Cud is OSP.
Theorem 12 extends the result in [10] to the more general case of multi-dimensional agents.
Due to lack of space, the proof is omitted.
Algorithm 3 presents an implementation of the known Greedy-by-valuation mechanism
for the case of unknown-bundle single minded agents.
I Theorem 13. Algorithm 3 is an OSP mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio
ρ ≤ δ for the case of unknown-bundle single-minded agents, where δ is the size of the largest
desired set.
Proof. The approximation guarantee of the algorithm is folklore. By Theorem 12, it remains
to prove that Algorithm 3 is valuation-extremal and belongs to class Cud . Indeed, note that
when an agent is queried in line 4 then she is separating all types with valuation v′, which is
the maximum compatible valuation at this point of the execution, with all types consistent
to smaller values v (regardless of the desired bundles).
We will now prove that the algorithm belongs to class Cud (see Definition 11). Let u be
the node of the implementation tree in which (v, S) is separated from (v′, S′) with v′ ≥ v
and S′ ⊆ S; clearly there is nothing to separate if v = v′ and S = S′. Consider first the case
that v′ > v; u corresponds to a query at line 4. Assume that there exists b−i ∈ D−i(u) for
which S is won by agent i when playing according to (v, S). This means that S is feasible
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Algorithm 3 An extensive-form implementation of the Greedy-by-valuation algorithm.
1 P ← ∅ (P is the set of bundles that have already been allocated) N ← N (N is the
set of agents currently under consideration) Di ← Di for all i ∈ N (Di is the set of
values in i’s domain currently under consideration)
2 while N 6= ∅ do
3 Let j = arg maxk∈N maxDk
4 Ask j if her valuation is maxDj
5 if yes then
6 Ask agent j to reveal her desired set Rj
7 if there is S in P such that Rj ∩ S 6= ∅ then
8 N = N \ {j}
9 else
10 P ← P ∪ {Rj}
11 N = N \ {j}
12 else
13 Dj = Dj \ {maxDj}
14 Return P
at u; since S′ ⊆ S then S′ is also feasible at that point. Therefore, the feasibility check in
line 7 is successful and S′ is won by agent i playing according to (v′, S′) irrevocably at that
point, that is for any b−i ∈ D−i(u), as requested. Consider now the case in which v′ = v
and S′ ⊂ S; u corresponds to a query at line 6. Again, if S is feasible at this point of the
execution, so is S′. Therefore, S′ is allocated if S is, and the proof is complete. J
5 Randomised mechanisms for known-bundle single-minded agents
In this section we consider randomised mechanisms that are universally OSP. We note that
the bounded rationality assumption that motivates OSP does not prevent agents from using
and understanding such a mechanism, as they do not need to compute expected utilities to
determine obvious dominance. We start by presenting a class of randomised mechanisms
that are universally OSP.
I Definition 14 (MR mechanisms). We define a classMR of randomised mechanisms, that
work as follows:
Fix some probability distribution F on the domain D of valuations of all agents. A
mechanism M ∈ MR selects one of the values v in D according to F and asks every
agent if her valuation is at least equal to v. M selects the maximum number of agents
whose requests can be satisfied simultaneously, allocates them their desired bundles and
charges each of them v.
I Lemma 15. Any mechanism M ∈MR is universally OSP.
Proof. We claim that any mechanism that belongs to classMR is a randomisation among
different deterministic OSP mechanisms. Indeed, fix a value v ∈ D and consider the
mechanism that queries all agents if their valuation is at least equal to v and outputs a
feasible solution that allocates their desired bundles to the maximum number of agents who
reply yes. It should be easy to see that if, when queried, an agent signals yes when her true
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valuation is smaller than v, then the best she can achieve is 0 utility, which is what she
would achieve by signalling truthfully. On the other hand, if, when queried, an agent signals
no when her true valuation is at least equal to v, then the best she can achieve is 0 utility,
which is at least what she would achieve by signalling truthfully. J
I Theorem 16. Consider mechanism MF ∈MR (Definition 14), where F is a probability
distribution assigning probability pj to value Vj ∈ D, with Vj > Vj−1, for j ∈ {1, . . . , d} (set






−1 and pj = p1(1− Vj−1
Vj
)
, for j ∈ {2, . . . , d}.
Then MF is a universally OSP randomised mechanism that achieves a min
{






approximation of the optimal SW for known-bundle single-minded agents, where d = |D|.
Proof. Lemma 15 straightforwardly implies that MF is universally OSP. Denote by Tj the
set of agents who are allocated their desired bundles after MF selects Vj with probability
pj . Also, let T ∗j denote the set of agents i such that vi = Vj who are allocated their desired
bundle in the optimal allocation.




Vj · |T ∗j |




































(V` − V`−1) = p1
∑
j≤d
|T ∗j | · Vj
= p1 · SW ∗,
where the inequality holds because by definition of mechanism MF , Tj is the maximum
cardinality set of agents with valuations at least Vj that can be satisfied simultaneously, and
the third equality uses the definition V0 = 0.









So, the right-hand-side of (5) is strictly less than d. It remains to prove that ρ ≤ 1 + ln(VdV1 ).
The expression in (5) is maximised if
∑
2≤j≤d Vj−1/Vj is minimised. Letting X1, . . . , Xd−1
denote the ratios V1/V2, . . . , Vd−1/Vd, and letting c denote the ratio V1/Vd, this amounts
to minimising
∑
i∈[d−1] Xi subject to
∏
i∈[d−1] Xi = c. By the inequality of arithmetic and
geometric means it holds that
∑
i∈[d−1] Xi ≥ n · c1/d−1 for any solution to this minimisation
problem, and furthermore this holds with equality for the solution where Xi = c1/d−1 for all
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i ∈ [d− 1]. We conclude from this that the expression in (5)) is maximised if all the ratios
Vj−1/Vj in the summation are equal (for a fixed choice of Vd/V1), and this is achieved by
setting Vj = V
j−1
d−1
d so that Vj−1/Vj = (Vd/V1)−1/(d−1), for all 2 ≤ j ≤ d. Inequality (5) then
yields












where the last inequality holds because 1 + ln(Vd/V1) is the limit of the left hand side, and
the left hand side is increasing in d. This completes the proof. J
We note that a similar bound of O (ln (r)) can be achieved in settings where the valuation
space is uncountable and contained in an interval [a, b] with b/a = r. One can define a
continuous version of MF by deriving its limit running on Dε as ε approaches 0. The
mechanism would then work as follows:
(i) Draw a valuation x ∈ [a, b] according to the cumulative distribution function F , with
F (x) = ln(x/a)+1ln(r)+1 .
(ii) Ask each agent whether her valuation exceeds x.
(iii) Compute the maximum cardinality feasible solution Tx among all yes-responding agents.
A similar analysis to that in the proof of Theorem 16 yields the desired bound.
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